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Competition over vital resources is a potent source of international friction
among nations and within states. The result is the increasing interplay of
international and internal struggles and the growing militarization of the
global energy resource quest.
Ever since the end of the Cold War, conflict analysts have sought to identify and explain the main sources of friction and strife in the
international system. Until that point, most violent conflict was assumed to
reflect or embody the global rivalry between the United States and the
Soviet Union. With the termination of that great struggle, however, it has
become more difficult to explain the crises and wars that have erupted in
different parts of the world. Various theories have been advanced to satisfy
this need, many revolving around identity politics and the “clash of civiliza-
tions,” as Professor Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard University would
have it. Since 9/11, moreover, the emergence of incendiary anti-Western
politics within the Islamic world has also been cited as a major source of
disorder. But while identity politics and Islamic extremism certainly repre-
sent important sources of strife, they do not provide a full explanation for
the outbreak of violent conflict in the current period or for the growing
friction among the great powers. Clearly, other sources of rivalry and
aggression must be at work. It is the author’s view that intense competition
for control over vital resources — oil, water, land, minerals, diamonds, old-
growth timber, deep-sea fisheries, and so on — is an especially potent source
of international friction and disorder.1
The pursuit of valuable resources has, of course, long been recognized as
a major source of conflict. Indeed, the competitive pursuit of overseas
colonies was a major source of friction between the major European powers
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between 1500 and the outbreak of World War I — a struggle that led to
periodic wars between these powers as well as to prodigious slaughter in
the colonies themselves. World War II also entailed resource-driven aggres-
sion, particularly in the oil-rich Caucasus and Dutch East Indies — the first
a major objective of Germany’s 1941 invasion of the USSR, the second a
target of Japan’s 1941 foray into Southeast Asia. During the Cold War,
however, material interests of this sort were accorded second place to
ideological struggle; a nation’s allegiance to either Washington or Moscow
and not its resource endowment, was the major determinant of its role in
world affairs. But with the end of the Cold War, resource competition has
again assumed its accustomed role as a major source of rivalry and conflict.
The competition for access to major sources of critical materials has also
emerged as a major source of friction within states. Many of the disputes
identified in the Western press as ethnic or religious disputes — such as
those in Afghanistan, Angola, Congo, Indonesia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, and Sudan — are, in fact, struggles between competing warlords,
militias, and government factions for control over valuable mines, oil fields,
timber stands, and other key resources. Outside powers and the giant
multinational corporations often become entangled in these struggles,
notably when they side with one faction or another in an effort to maximize
their extraction of critical resources.
From a global perspective, then, we are witnessing the emergence of an
increasingly complex and volatile interplay of international and internal
struggles over the control of vital resources. On one side of this equation
are the major powers — the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and
Western Europe — that seek dominion over major resource-producing
areas, such as the oil and natural gas fields of the Persian Gulf and Caspian
Sea basins. On the other side are local factions — warlords, tribal chief-
tains, militia leaders, and so on — that aim to monopolize the revenues
generated by particular resource deposits while enjoying the continued
protection and support of their great-power patrons. The result, all too
often, is the accelerated intrusion of arms, advisors, troops, and mercenaries
into areas that are already bedeviled by internecine conflict.
Historically, international competition and conflict of this sort — aimed
at the control or occupation of critical geographic features (rivers, harbors,
islands) and vital resource sites — has come under the heading of geopoli-
tics. Once a respectable analytical term, geopolitics fell into disrepute when
employed by the militarists in Germany and Japan to justify the acquisition
of lebensraum in Europe in the one case and an imperial domain in Asia in
the other. The term further lost legitimacy during the Cold War era, when
noble principle — and not material interest — supposedly governed the
behavior of both superpowers. But no expression better captures the policies
and behavior of the United States, Russia, China, and other major powers in
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Perhaps no area better illustrates this trend than the Caspian Sea basin,
consisting of the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan plus Iran and Russia. This area
is thought to harbor vast reserves of oil and natural gas, but is also the site
of numerous ethnic conflicts, religious antagonisms, and territorial disputes.
To further complicate matters, the Caspian itself is landlocked, and so any
oil exiting the area for markets elsewhere must travel by pipeline through
contested or wartorn areas before arriving at ports in stable countries.
Within this region, for example, are the embattled ethnic enclaves of
Chechnya, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite this,
the leaders of Russia, China, and the United States all seek to exercise a
degree of control over developments in the region and thereby gain access
to its valuable energy supplies. This, in turn, has led to an infusion of arms
and military advisers into the region, and to the establishment of new
military bases. (I will say more about this later.)
The reemergence of geopolitical competition of this sort in the current era
and the growing risk of conflict over vital resources is the product of many
factors. Four, in particular, merit our attention: first, a relentless increase in
the demand for energy supplies and other vital materials; second, indica-
tions that the global supply of these materials may not grow fast enough to
satisfy surging demand or may in fact decline; third, a growing reliance on
materials obtained from chronically unstable areas of the developing world;
and fourth, an increasing tendency to view resource scarcities and disputes
through the lens of military policy and to act accordingly. Because the first,
second, and third of these factors are not likely to abate in the years ahead,
the fourth can only grow more pronounced. It behooves us, then, to examine
each of these factors in greater detail, focusing in particular on oil and
natural gas.
Insatiable Demand
Economies — all economies — run on energy. Energy is needed to produce
food and manufacture goods, to power machines and appliances, to trans-
port raw materials and finished products, and to provide heat and light.
Since World War II, economic growth around the world has been fueled
largely by abundant supplies of hydrocarbons: petroleum and natural gas.
Since 1950, worldwide oil consumption has grown eightfold, from approxi-
mately 10 to 80 million barrels per day; gas consumption, which began from
a smaller base, has grown even more dramatically. Today, hydrocarbons
provide 62 percent of the world’s total energy supply — approximately 250
quadrillion BTUs out of a total supply of 404 quads. But no matter how
important today, hydrocarbons will prove even more critical in the future:
according to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), oil and gas will account
for a larger share of world energy in 2025 — 65 percent — than they do
today.3 And because no other source of energy is currently available to
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replace oil and gas if these resources become scarce, the future health of the
world economy rests on the planet’s ability to produce more and more
hydrocarbons.
The future availability of oil and gas also affects another key aspect of
the global economic equation: the growing challenge to the older industrial-
ized nations posed by dynamic new economies in East Asia, South Asia, and
Latin America. At present, the industrialized countries account for approxi-
mately two-thirds of total world energy use. Because these countries, for the
most part, possess mature and efficient economies, their demand for energy
is expected to increase by a relatively modest 35 percent between 2001 and
2025, a conceivably manageable rate of increase. But demand in the devel-
oping world is growing at a much faster rate than in the older industrialized
countries, and so their share of total world consumption will rise to nearly
half by 2025, and when their added demand is combined with that of the
industrialized countries, the net world increase jumps from 35 to 54 percent
over this period — a much more demanding challenge to the global energy
industry.4
The developing countries are especially hungry for increased oil and
natural gas supplies. According to the DOE, oil consumption by the devel-
oping world will increase by 96 percent between 2001 and 2025, while
consumption of natural gas will rise by 103 percent. For China and India,
the rate of growth is even more dramatic: China’s oil consumption is pro-
jected to jump by 156 percent over this period and India’s by 152 percent.5
The struggle by these countries and other developing powerhouses like
South Korea and Brazil to obtain additional oil and gas for their growing
economies will naturally pit them against the older industrialized countries
in the competitive pursuit of energy. As suggested by Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice after the Crawford, Texas, meeting between President
Bush and Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, on April 25, 2005,
“Obviously, with the states like China, India, and others coming on line,
there is concern about demand and supply.”6
Uncertain Supply
Accommodating the growing demand from China, India, and the others
would not be a significant problem if we had great confidence that the
global energy industry is capable of generating the necessary additional
supplies. And, in fact, the U.S. Department of Energy wants us to believe
that this is, indeed, the case: that future oil and gas supplies will be more
than sufficient to satisfy anticipated world demand. But many experts
dispute this view. World oil and gas supplies, they argue, will never achieve
the elevated levels promised by the DOE. This is true because much of the
world’s known hydrocarbon reserves have already been exhausted and
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because not enough new fields have been discovered in recent years to make
up for the depletion of older reservoirs.
Take the case of oil. The DOE predicts that global petroleum output will
reach 120.6 million barrels per day in 2025 — 44 million more than at
present and just a tad shy of anticipated world demand of 121 million
barrels per day.7 For this to occur, the major oil firms must discover massive
new reserves and substantially increase their output from existing fields. But
few large fields have been discovered during the past forty years, and only
one — the Kashagan field in the Caspian Sea — has been found in the past
ten years. At the same time, daily production at many older fields in North
America, Russia, and the Middle East has significantly declined. As a result,
many geologists now believe that the global petroleum industry will not be
capable of rising to the 120 million barrels level projected by the DOE, but
instead will “peak” — reach maximum sustainable yield — at a level far
below that number.8
Predictions that global oil output will peak between now and 2025 and
fall far short of the DOE’s projections are highly controversial, with some
experts insisting that petroleum will remain plentiful in the years ahead and
others asserting that peak oil has already arrived.9 This is not the place to
assess these competing claims. But one way to get at this issue is to look at
the all-important case of Saudi Arabia, the world’s leading supplier and the
best prospect for higher production in the future. According to the DOE,
Saudi Arabian oil output will more than double between 2001 and 2025,
jumping from 10.2 to 22.5 million barrels per day.10 If Saudi Arabia can, in
fact, raise its output by this amount we can have some degree of confidence
that total world supplies will be adequate to satisfy anticipated demand at
the end of this period. But there are growing indications that Saudi Arabia is
not capable of raising its output by this amount, or anything close to it. In a
much-discussed 2004 article in the New York Times, industry analyst Jeff
Gerth reported that “Oil executives and government officials in the United
States and Saudi Arabia . . . say capacity will probably stall near current
levels, potentially creating a significant gap in the global energy supply.”11
In response to Gerth’s assertions, Saudi officials insisted that their coun-
try is fully capable of boosting daily production by a sufficient amount to
satisfy anticipated world requirements. “Should [higher world demand]
actually materialize . . . we’re going to be ready to meet it,” Saudi Oil
Minister Ali I. Al-Naimi declared in February 2004. In particular, “we have
looked at scenarios of 12 million [barrels per day] capacity, we have looked
at 15 million capacity, and those are all feasible.”12 These and other such
pronouncements have provided some relief to those alarmed by Gerth’s
2004 report in the Times. But note that Al-Naimi spoke only of “scenarios”
for reaching 12 or 15 million barrels per day, not an ironclad guaranty; and
even this increase falls far short of the 22.5 million barrels projected by the
Department of Energy. Many energy analysts have suggested, moreover,
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that any drive by Saudi Arabia to boost its daily output above 10 million
barrels for any length of time will cause irreparable harm to its fields and
result in an inevitable drop in production. As noted by one senior Saudi oil
executive, an attempt to reach 12 million barrels per day would “wreak
havoc within a decade.”13
The question of Saudi Arabia’s future oil output is vitally important to
this discussion because it is highly unlikely that any other supplier (or
combination of suppliers) can make up the difference between Saudi
Arabia’s sustainable yield of 10–12 million barrels per day and the 22.5
million barrels projected by the DOE for 2025. Other big suppliers — Iran,
Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Russia, and Venezuela — will have a hard enough
time maintaining their own output at current levels, let alone fill in for the
missing Saudi oil. This being the case, it appears highly unlikely that the
global oil industry will be capable of satisfying anticipated world demand in
the years ahead; instead, we should expect chronic petroleum shortages,
higher prices, and persistent economic hardship.
It is precisely because of this prospect that many national leaders are now
placing greater emphasis on the acquisition of increased natural gas sup-
plies. Because gas was developed later in the industrial cycle than oil, its
principal sources of supply have not yet been fully exhausted, while new
fields, such as those in Iran and the East China Sea, await full-scale devel-
opment. Like oil, natural gas will eventually reach a global peak in output,
but this will not occur until a decade or so after oil has peaked. As petro-
leum output declines, therefore, natural gas is expected to take up some of
the slack, but only some, because there is not enough gas in the world to
fully replace petroleum in all its myriad uses. And it is for this reason that
many governments seek to gain control over or access to major gas reserves
now, before they are locked up by someone else.
Unstable Suppliers
While the timing and severity of the coming energy crunch remains a matter
of conjecture, there is no such debate regarding the next most critical factor
in the global energy equation: the historical shift in the locus of world oil
production from the industrial nations of the global North to the developing
nations of the global South. This is a natural consequence of the fact that
commercial oil production began in the United States, Canada, and Europe
(including Romania and the Caucasus region of the Russian/Soviet empire),
and only gradually spread to the developing world. With the passage of
time, the earliest fields to be exploited — including those in the United
States and Europe — reached their maximum sustainable output and began
an inevitable decline. But because the giant fields in the developing world
came into production later, they have not yet reached their peak capacity
and are still on the upswing. Hence, while two-thirds of world oil produc-
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tion was concentrated in the North in 1950 and only one-third in the devel-
oping world, today the ratio is almost exactly reversed, with approximately
two-thirds of world oil coming the South and only one-third from the North.
This shift in the locus of oil production has enormous geopolitical conse-
quences, as virtually all of the newer producers — mainly countries in the
Persian Gulf area, West Africa, the Caspian Sea basin, and the Andean
region of South America — are riddled with corruption and subject to
recurring political, ethnic, and religious disorder. In Nigeria, for example,
ethnic minorities in the oil-producing Delta region are battling entrenched
elites in the federal capital of Abuja; in Venezuela, an ongoing struggle
between supporters and opponents of President Hugo Chávez has impaired
national oil output; and in Iraq, anti-American insurgents are attacking
pipelines and refineries on a near-daily basis. It is these and other such
disturbances, that is primarily responsible for the current surge in oil
prices.14
It is possible, of course, that order will be restored in these countries and
their oil output increased. It is far more likely, however, that the unrest will
intensify and spread to other producers, further curtailing the global avail-
ability of petroleum. This is not due to a lack of oil in the ground, but rather
to the inherently unstable nature of Third World oil producers, many of
which emerged from the colonial era with feeble political structures and
large pockets of ethnic unrest. “Unlike past concerns,” Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan observed in October 2004, “the current situation
reflects an increasing fear that existing reserves and productive capacity
have become subject to potential geopolitical adversity.” Such concerns
“are not frivolous,” he noted, “given the stark realities evident in many
areas of the world.”15
The Militarization of the Global Energy Quest
The advent of “geopolitical adversity” in the energy-producing regions
leads to the fourth and final factor in the global resource equation: the
growing militarization of international efforts to secure foreign sources of
oil and natural gas. Rather than rely on market forces alone, the United
States and other major consumers are increasingly committed to the use of
military force to protect overseas pipelines and refineries, guard extended
tanker routes, defend beleaguered oil producers, and otherwise ensure the
safe flow of energy. This has already led to the establishment of a large U.S.
military presence in the Persian Gulf region, and is now being followed by
the introduction of American forces in oil-producing areas of the Caspian
Sea region, West Africa, and Latin America. Other great powers, including
Russia, and China are behaving in a roughly analogous fashion. The stage
is being set, therefore, for recurring conflicts over access to foreign energy
supplies.
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The use of force to protect oil is not, of course, an entirely new phenom-
enon. The British government first viewed the protection of foreign oil
supplies as a major military priority during World War I, when oil-powered
ships, tanks, and planes first made their appearance on the battlefield. After
the Great War, Britain extended its military reach to the oil kingdoms of the
Persian Gulf, including Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait; the Soviet Union followed a
similar path in the Caucasus region, then a major producing area.16 The
United States got into the act after World War II, when it sought to establish
a protectorate over Saudi Arabia and to deny the Soviet Union access to the
greater Gulf region. In 1980, the protection of Persian Gulf oil was made an
explicit goal of U.S. security policy when President Jimmy Carter told
Congress that the United States would use “any means necessary, including
military force” to block efforts by hostile powers to cut off the flow of
petroleum. This principle was later cited by President George H. W. Bush to
justify U.S. intervention in the first Persian Gulf conflict (1990–91) and
provided the underlying rationale for the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Today,
the United States maintains a vast military presence in the Persian Gulf
area, and this presence is likely to remain so long as oil is considered vital to
the U.S. economy.17
But while the Persian Gulf remains the major focus of American concern,
it is not the only oil-producing region to elicit this sort of interest: the United
States is also building up its military presence in other oil-producing areas,
including the Caspian Sea basin, Colombia, and West Africa. As a result,
the U.S. military is being gradually transformed into a global oil-protection
service.18
The process is most advanced in the Caspian Sea basin. The United States
first took a significant interest in this area in the early 1990s, when the
former Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia declared their
independence from Moscow and sought to establish ties with the West.
Eager to lessen America’s dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf area,
President Clinton eagerly supported efforts by U.S. energy firms to acquire
concessions to promising oil and natural gas fields in the region and to
construct new pipelines from the land-locked Caspian to the West. Fully
aware of the region’s inherent instability — a product of age-old ethnic
rivalries and the traumatic legacy of Russia/Soviet imperialism — Clinton
also sought to protect these new energy assets by bolstering the military
capabilities of the Caspian countries and by enhancing America’s ability to
conduct military operations in this area. This process began well before
9/11, but has been accelerated since then by President Bush and now entails
the maintenance of permanent U.S. military bases in the region along with
substantially increased military aid to friendly local powers.19
A similar trajectory can be detected in Colombia and Africa. Claiming
that the protection of Colombia’s highly vulnerable oil infrastructure from
guerrilla attack is an integral part of the government’s drive to restore order
in the countryside, the Bush administration has authorized the deployment
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of U.S. Special Forces specialists in Colombia to train and advise the gov-
ernment troops now helping to guard the Caño Límon pipeline in the north-
east against guerrilla attack. Other U.S. advisers are working with Colom-
bian forces assigned to protect oil-exploration operations in the Putomayo
province, another insurgent stronghold. Slowly but surely, the United States
is becoming involved in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign in Colom-
bia — and it is the protection of oil, not the war on drugs, that appears to
be driving this process.20
The projection of U.S. military power is less well advanced in West
Africa, but is no less troubling. At present, there are no American troops
permanently assigned to Africa, but U.S. military instructors are helping to
enhance the combat capacity of friendly nations and the Department of
Defense is looking for possible basing locations in the area.21 These efforts
are typically described as a response to the presence of terrorist groups in
Africa, but one Pentagon official told the Wall Street Journal that “a key
mission for U.S. forces would be to ensure that Nigeria’s oil fields, which in
the future could account for as much as 25 percent of U.S. oil imports, are
secure.”22
Nor is the United States alone in seeking geopolitical advantage in the
major oil-producing areas. Russia and China, for reasons of their own, are
following a similar course. Russia, which once incorporated the Caspian
basin into its imperial territory, now seeks to reassert its control over the
area, using both economic and military means to achieve its objectives.
China, for its part, seeks to acquire an ever increasing supply of oil and
natural gas from this region, and so aims to establish close ties with the key
governments involved. In pursuit of their goals, both countries have pro-
vided arms to friendly regimes and deployed military advisers in the area.
China has also extended its geopolitical reach to Africa and the Persian
Gulf, in some cases aiding countries like Iran and Sudan that are viewed as
potential adversaries of the United States. As a result of all this, more and
more arms are flowing into these areas and the groundwork is being laid for
a continuing series of regional oil conflicts.23
The Emerging Security Environment
What can we expect from this intensifying struggle over valuable sources of
oil and gas? As the episodes described earlier suggest, national leaders are
placing greater emphasis on the competitive pursuit of energy than ever
before. In her jaunts around the world — in India, Russia, and, most re-
cently, Latin America — Condoleezza Rice has raised the energy issue at
every turn, pressing America’s allies and business partners to supply us with
more oil and to ignore the appeal of “rogue” producers like Iran and Ven-
ezuela. Many other world leaders, like Vladimir Putin of Russia and
Junichiro Koizumi of Japan, have behaved in a similar fashion, albeit with
an energy-dictated agenda of their own.
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What is so striking in all of this is the degree to which the quest for
energy has been elevated to a national security matter, on an equal plane
with efforts to combat nuclear proliferation and international terrorism.
Thus it was the president’s national security adviser, not the Secretary of
Energy, who briefed reporters on the outcome of Bush’s April 25 meeting
with Crown Prince Abdullah, and it is the Secretary of State, Condoleezza
Rice, who is leading the charge for the administration’s global energy
policy. The difficulties arising from inadequate supply, she declared, “have
to be addressed, not by jawboning, but by having a strategic plan for
dealing with the problem.”24 Anyone familiar with Bush administration
lexicology cannot help but be a bit concerned by this call for a “strategic
plan” to obtain additional energy — redolent, as it is, of the administration’s
bellicose, preemptive strategy for dealing with terrorism, “rogue states,”
and weapons of mass destruction.
What is true for the United States is also the case for other major oil-
importing countries. Warning that China has outperformed India in the
pursuit of new oil and gas reserves, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
declared in January that New Delhi would have to accelerate its efforts in
this area. “I find China ahead of us in planning for the future in the field of
energy security,” he told a convention of Indian oil and gas executives. “We
can no longer be complacent and must learn to think strategically, to think
ahead, and to act swiftly and decisively.”25
Japanese leaders, too, have stressed the need for decisive action. Tokyo’s
decision to proceed with drilling in contested areas of the East China Sea is
just one indication of this outlook. Equally striking is Japan’s effort to
extend a new oil pipeline in Siberia to Nakhodka, on the Sea of Japan,
rather than to Daquing, in China. Originally, Moscow had planned to
terminate the pipeline in China, as part of a plan to strengthen Sino-Russian
energy cooperation. But after Prime Minister Koizumi flew to Moscow and
offered billions of dollars in additional aid and technology to Russia, Presi-
dent Putin indicated a preference for the Nakhodka route, which will facili-
tate oil deliveries to Japan. This has not deterred Chinese leaders from
seeking a reversal of this decision, claiming that the “strategic partnership”
between Moscow and Beijing outweighs the purely mercantile interests of
Japan.26
So far, none of these efforts has led to more than verbal sparring, bidding
wars, and the occasional outbreak of street protests, as in the anti-Japanese
demonstrations that errupted in Shanghai and Beijing in the spring of 2005.
But if history is any guide, such friction — when combined with other
sources of animosity, like China’s smoldering resentments over Japanese
atrocities during World War II — can lead to more violent forms of competi-
tion. This is certainly the case in the East China Sea, where Chinese and
Japanese planes and gunboats have already made threatening passes at one
another. Tensions are sure to rise, moreover, when (and if) Japan com-
mences drilling in waters claimed by China. “If real exploration starts, we
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cannot totally exclude the possibility of Japanese private company ships
having to face Chinese military ships,” said Junichi Abe, an analyst at the
Kazankai Foundation in Tokyo.27 And if this were to occur, the Japanese
government would come under enormous political pressure to protect those
private vessels with planes and warships of its own, thereby setting the
stage for an armed confrontation with China, whether intended or not.
Similar escalation could occur in other cases of disputed energy claims. In
the Caspian Sea, for example, Iran seeks control over offshore oil and gas
fields also claimed by Azerbaijan, an ally of the United States. In July 2001,
an Iranian gunboat steamed into the contested area and chased off an oil-
company exploration vessel operating their under Azerbaijani auspices. In
response, the United States has pledged to help Azerbaijan build a small
Caspian navy, to better protect its offshore energy claims. On April 11, John
J. Fialka of the Wall Street Journal revealed that the U.S. Department of
Defense will spend $100 million over the next few years to establish the
“Caspian Guard,” a network of police forces and special-operations units
“that can respond to various emergencies, including attacks on oil facili-
ties.”28 Russia is also expanding its Caspian Fleet, as it, too, presses its
claims to offshore fields in the region. It is all too easy, then, to imagine how
a minor confrontation, such as the 2001 incident involving an Iranian
gunboat, could erupt into something much more serious, involving some
combination of American, Russian, and Iranian forces.
Territorial disputes of this sort with significant energy dimensions can be
found in other areas, including the Red Sea, the South China Sea, the
Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Bakassi Peninsula (a narrow
stretch of land claimed both by Nigeria and Cameroon). In each of these
areas, opposing claimants have employed military force on occasion to
assert their control or to drive off the forces of a challenger. None of these
incidents has led to a full-scale conflict, but lives have been lost and the risk
of renewed fighting persists. As the global struggle for energy intensifies,
therefore, the danger of escalation will grow.
How all of this will play out cannot be foreseen. But it is important to
recognize that energy-related pressures are bound to increase as global
demand continues its upward course and the supply of oil and natural gas
fails to keep pace. At present, these pressures are being mediated by market
forces and diplomacy; presumably, this will continue to be the case. But,
once a problem has become tagged as a matter of national security, as is
now the case with energy, it passes from the realm of economics and moves
into the realm of military policy. With this, the generals and strategists get
into the act, and begin their ceaseless planning for assorted “contingencies”
and “emergencies.” No one may intend to go to war over oil or gas, but it is
in this sort of an environment that small incidents evolve into crises and
crises into wars.
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Alan Larson
Ensuring the reliability of global energy supplies will call for policies that
both encourage the use of newer, cleaner energy technologies and address
the political challenges posed by the world’s growing demand for oil and
natural gas. U.S. policy seeks to encourage expansion and diversification of
world energy supplies and to promote the transparency and democratic
institutions that help energy-producing countries make the most productive
use of their resources.
Energy is the vital ingredient in the world economy. While we are work
 
ing hard on energy efficiency and investing to develop new energy
technologies, oil and natural gas will remain critical for many years to
come. Economic development around the world means global demand for
oil and gas will continue growing in the near term. Most significantly,
China’s rapid growth and increase in overall energy demand continue to
affect energy markets. Some analysts estimate that China could account for
as much as one-third of the world’s marginal increase in oil demand in the
coming years.
As a result, the world must find and develop more reliable supplies of oil
and gas at prices that permit sustained economic growth. Unfortunately, it
is almost an axiom in the petroleum business that oil and gas are most often
found in countries with challenging political regimes or difficult physical
geography.
Several realities shape our thinking about energy security and how we
should build reliability into our energy supplies:
• Two-thirds of the world’s known oil reserves are in the Middle East.
• Imports supply roughly half of the oil and 15 percent of natural gas
consumed by the United States, and an even greater share of the
needs of some of the United State’s most important allies and eco-
nomic partners.
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• Oil-supply shocks in any region of the world will have an impact on
the U.S. economy through the instantaneous operation of interna-
tional oil markets.
Reliability through Diversification
Energy investments are costly and risky, requiring long-term commitments.
Recognizing this reality, U.S. energy policy seeks to encourage expansion
and diversification of energy supplies. A number of regions are attracting
increasing interest from energy companies in the United States and else-
where. We see interesting prospects for expanded oil and gas production in
the Caspian region, Russia, West Africa, and North and South America, as
well as the promise of increased oil and gas production in the Middle East.
In each of these regions, our policy aims to support private sector–led
development of energy resources by reducing the political uncertainty that
otherwise might hinder needed investment.
Russia and the Caspian Basin
Russia already is an energy superpower. To achieve its full potential, Russia
needs to strengthen corporate governance and the legal/regulatory frame-
work for business, improve its foreign investment climate, allow competition
in the transportation system, open up the gas and oil companies Gazprom
and Transneft to reform and competition, improve its technological capabili-
ties, and move domestic energy prices to world levels.
The Caspian Basin has tremendous potential, offering the possibility of
production increases from 1.6 million barrels/day (b/d) in 2001 to 5.0 million
b/d in 2010. The key issues in Caspian energy development at the moment
are to: 1) complete the second pillar of the East-West Energy Corridor by
developing the South Caucasus natural gas pipeline; 2) improve the invest-
ment climate throughout the region; and 3) bring Kazakhstani oil into the
East-West corridor.
Multiple pipelines that economically bring Caspian resources to the world
market strengthen the sovereignty and economic viability of the new nation
states in the region. U.S. efforts in the Caspian are intended to complement
— not detract from — U.S. support for Russia’s efforts to develop its energy
export potential.
Africa
Africa is playing an increasingly important role as an energy supplier to
U.S. and global markets. In 2003, both Nigeria and Angola were among the
top ten suppliers of oil to the United States. Oil production generates sub-
stantial revenue in countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Equatorial
Guinea, Republic of Congo, Chad, and Cameroon. São Tomé and
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Mauritania also may become oil suppliers in the coming years. Foreign
direct investment is needed to develop African energy resources as most
new fields are in deepwater offshore environments that require advanced
capital-intensive facilities for development. Growing oil and gas production
could be a powerful engine for national economic development in these
countries. However, the Niger Delta experience of 2002, in which protesters
stormed oil facilities and caused their temporary shutdown, shows that oil
can also be a disruptive force if a country’s oil revenues are not managed in
a fair and transparent manner. Nigeria has learned from its experience in
the Niger Delta and is setting an example on transparency and economic
reform enabled by oil revenues that the United States hopes other countries
in Africa will follow.
North America
The most important and reliable sources of energy for the United States are
its neighbors and we are strengthening our energy cooperation with Canada
and Mexico. Senior energy experts from Canada, Mexico, and the United
States recently released a North American Energy Picture report that, for
the first time, jointly measures energy stocks, trading balances, and energy
flows. What often goes unrecognized is that North American energy trade is
a two-way street. Mexico is becoming an important source of U.S. oil
imports. At the same time, the United States is a net natural gas exporter to
Mexico, and U.S. refineries supply over 15 percent of Mexico’s refined
petroleum products.
The reliability of North American energy trade is enhanced by geo-
graphic proximity. More important than geography, however, are the rule of
law and predictable investment conditions created by the North American
Free Trade Agreement, integrated pipeline networks, and long-term reliable
supply relationships. We are continually working to enhance this framework
of rule of law and predictable investment conditions in North America even
as we seek to build similar frameworks in other regions.
Venezuela
Venezuela and the United States have enjoyed strong historical energy ties.
Venezuelan oil policy, until recently, has been built upon a reputation of
reliability. Unfortunately, actions and statements by parties from all sides
over the last 18 months have called into question the priority Venezuelans
place on their reputation as a reliable supplier. The United States will
continue to work to help Venezuelans resolve their political differences. But
until a constitutional, democratic, peaceful, and electoral solution is
achieved, and the level of rhetoric lowered, world energy markets simply
cannot view Venezuela with the same certainty that they once did. When
The Geopolitics of Oil and Natural Gas
218
the Venezuelan parties show a commitment to reconciliation, they will find
a willing and ready partner in the United States.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Producers
The Middle East holds some two-thirds of proven world oil reserves. The
size of its reserves, combined with its low production cost, guarantees that
the Middle East will continue to play a pivotal role in the world energy
market. Saudi Arabia plays a key role in global oil markets as the world’s
largest oil exporter. Moreover, Saudi Arabia supports international energy
security by maintaining considerable excess production capacity that can be
brought on line quickly in the event of a serious supply disruption anywhere
in the world.
Diversifying global oil supplies should not be interpreted as diversifying
“away” from Saudi Arabia or other Gulf producers. Gulf producers will
continue to have an indispensable role in the world market, and the United
States encourages them to increase foreign investment and steadily expand
supplies. What we seek is better balance and a more flexible, resilient oil
market that responds to price signals.
In this regard, Gulf producers could reap greater benefits by opening
their economies to more private investment so that oil and gas capacity
could grow and energy supplies could respond more fully to shifts in de-
mand. Investment in natural gas is one sector where this process is begin-
ning. Once only for local or regional use or wasted through harmful flaring,
natural gas in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has become an
increasingly globally traded energy source for key markets. Qatar is work-
ing with major international energy companies to become a leading LNG
exporter.
In the United Arab Emirates, the successful Taweelah power and water
privatization project is another example of the dynamic role foreign invest-
ment can play in the energy sector. The United States supports these positive
private investment initiatives because they expand and diversify its energy
sources, provide opportunities for U.S. companies, and foster economic
growth in energy-producing nations.
Promoting Transparency and a Good
Investment Climate
Promoting transparency and good governance is a key part of the U.S.
strategy of encouraging diversification. Oil and gas projects are controver-
sial in many developing countries because revenue flows are hidden, or
diverted, and average citizens feel they receive no benefit from their
country’s natural wealth. The United States wants oil-producing countries
to invest energy revenue in solid and sustainable economic development for
their populations, not only because it is the right thing to do, but also be-
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cause it builds political support for the further development of energy
projects. Democratic processes and the development of responsive govern-
ing institutions promote political and economic stability, the use of mineral
wealth for poverty reduction and economic development, and the reduction
of oil-related conflicts in energy-producing countries around the world.
A comprehensive approach to transparency is particularly important. At
the June 2003 Group of Eight (G-8) Summit, President Bush and the other
leaders endorsed a comprehensive action plan on Fighting Corruption and
Improving Transparency. The core of this approach is forging a partnership
to give willing host countries technical and political support to strengthen
domestic institutions and enhance transparency and accountability. We
want to focus specifically on budget, procurement, and concession-letting
transparency, including G-8 support for technical needs identified by ex-
perts.
In addition to support for developing country action plans in these areas,
the G-8 leaders committed to:
• denying safe haven to corrupt leaders and their assets by, among
other things, denying visas to corrupt officials
• pushing for accelerated implementation of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development’s Anti-Bribery Convention
• encouraging the World Bank and other international financial
institutions to insist on greater transparency in the use of funds by
borrowing countries
G-8 countries are supporting voluntary compacts among governments, the
companies operating in those countries, and civil society to improve trans-
parency in public financial management and accountability. These compacts
outline both the political commitment of the G-8 and host governments to
achieve specific mutually agreed transparency objectives, with assistance
from the G-8 and international financial institutions, and a specific concrete
action plan to achieve those goals.
Conclusion
In the long run we need new technologies such as hydrogen and carbon
sequestration that can fuel our economy while increasing energy security
and minimizing the environmental impact of energy use. In the interim, our
international energy policy must address the familiar challenges posed by a
hydrocarbon-based economy where oil reserves are concentrated in various
challenging regions of the world. Transparency and good governance are
increasingly important to sustaining international investments in energy
development in regions of opportunity for energy production. The United
States will continue to engage intensively with energy partners all over the
world to diversify supplies, improve investment opportunities, and assure
that market forces work as transparently and efficiently as possible.
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In the year 1968, Senator Hart of Michigan sent me to the State Depart- ment to do something that I believe no one who has handled energy
policy on the government side has ever done before or since — I read the
entire State Department archive from 1900 to 1968: fifteen, five-drawer
file cabinets with every memorandum of conversation, every presidential
speech on the subject, all the run-up material, all of the background mate-
rial.
What I found was an archive that showed that the government had
people with minimal knowledge on the subject, who got their information
about problems from the people in the industry, and who would manipulate
the information to get the result they wanted. And when things would get
out of control, they would offer advice to steer the solution in a direction
that would best serve the economic interests of the industries.
The first and most important thing for you to understand is that for at
least fifty years in the history of the oil industry, its biggest problem was
too much oil — I reiterate, too much oil — because the price of oil goes
down like a rock in a situation of oversupply. The price of oil in the United
States of America, actually went below zero during the time of the Great
Depression, when the big fields in Texas came in and gushers spilled out on
fields damaging crop land, because there was no storage.
The oil industry has been terrified by new supplies of oil, which would
be so cheap they would undercut the value of existing production. So if you
are an oil company and you have oil that is being produced at 10 dollars a
barrel and some fool finds a field in Saudi Arabia where the oil costs,
literally, eight cents a barrel out of the ground when it is first discovered,
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In every one of these cases where new oil was found, there were pro-
found and long negotiations and cartelization to prevent cheap production
from knocking down the world price of oil. There’s a marvelous story of the
Iraq Petroleum Company, which will give you the history of why we are in
a war in Iraq today.
There was in Iraq a company put together by the major oil companies. It
was part of a cartel. The whole story is laid out by the Federal Trade
Commission in a 1940 report that was held until after World War II because
all antitrust action was suspended for the duration of the war. The major oil
companies had come together in a meeting and had decided who would
produce oil where. In the Iraq Petroleum Company, the oil was jointly
owned by the Americans, Brits, and French.  They all had a vote on how
much would be produced, and it was agreed that they would not bring on
new production unless they were all involved in equal degrees.
The problem with Iraq Petroleum Company was it was the result of the
coup in 1957 and the oil was nationalized. The governments of the United
States and the United Kingdom and, for a while, the French, said, “That’s
our oil.  We’re going to make it impossible for you to sell it anywhere in the
world,” and they shut the Iraq Petroleum Company’s production down cold.
The French began to cheat. They went backstairs to the Iraqis and said,
“Look, we’ll cut a deal with you. Forget the embargo these guys are run-
ning. We’ll go behind their backs and we’ll help you sell the oil on world
markets.” The Americans and the Brits used diplomatic pressure on the
French not to do it, and we punished the Iraqis for nationalizing the oil.
At the time it was clear to the American companies that the reserves in
Iraq were greater than those in Saudi Arabia. And our interest in Iraq was
in keeping very cheap Iraqi oil off the market.
But the real problem is not Iraq, it is Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the
elephant in the closet. In 1945 after Yalta, President Roosevelt and King
Saud met. Harold Ickes had developed a proposal to turn the Saudi Arabian
reserve over to an American company, called the Petroleum Reserves
Corporation, which would be owned by the federal government. Ickes
perceived that if this reserve was left in private company hands, it would be
developed to suit the needs of private companies not the national interest,
but that debate was never had in public.
The companies took the reserve and we entered into a marriage, with the
devil — a family that says, “We own the country. We get to keep all the
money that comes out of these reserves, no matter who else lives in the
place. And, by the way, we are going to run the country as a thirteenth-
century monarchy. And you, by God, are going to keep it that way and
protect us in that job in perpetuity.”
So we have a problem here. And it was the same problem we had in Iran.
When you set up such a situation: a dictatorial, non-Democratic, vicious
government, and you get them in power and you give them all that money,
they figure out that they can use the money to manipulate your government.
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So they buy in: they buy into your politicians; they buy into your consulting
firms; they buy into your political systems; they buy into your advisors.
The Shah did it. The Saudis do it. And, by God, as long as the money is
flowing back, which was Henry Kissenger’s contribution to this mess, you
don’t care, because it’s coming back and being invested in your own coun-
try. So, the attitude is, forget about the deficit. That’s not important. The
question is, are they buying our bonds?  And as long as they are, who really
cares?
But the money is here, not there. And the guys who run that country think
they own it.  And we, of course, are sufficiently delusional to believe that
the guys who run that country will listen to us when, in fact, they figure
they bought us and we have to listen to them. Again, it is a marriage with
the devil and a very serious problem.
Now here’s the real nexus.  The Iraq war comes because this has been the
elephant in the closet for American foreign policy for the last thirty years.
Every administration has been on its knees praying that the corrupt Saudi
government will not collapse on their watch, that the thirteenth-century
government will stagger through another four years, and that the problem
that results when that government goes will be the next administration’s
problem. Because, the truth is, there are two politically unacceptable propo-
sitions in American politics. One, gas lines, which destroyed Jimmy Carter,
would destroy anybody else who had to confront them. Two, an unaccept-
ably high price of oil would cause riots, economic disruption, and all kinds
of other problems. So what happens if there is a real disruption in supply?
There is economic chaos. There is political chaos. Nobody wants it.
What happens if the government collapses in Saudi Arabia? There is the
prospect of real chaos and the situation has been getting more and more
untenable as time has gone by, with 22 million people in Saudi Arabia, two
million slaves, God knows how many tribals who don’t get a cut of the
action, a bunch of Shia who are working in the oil fields who aren’t part of
the royal family and won’t get the cut.
Essentially two million people get the wealth of the country, and every-
body else is cut out. This is not a long-term security situation.
The invasion of Iraq is a reflection of this insecurity. Because had Saddam
Hussein continued in power and the Saudi government collapsed, we’d be in
a real mess, because then all of the oil in the Middle East would be out of
our control. None of it would be sold by American companies. And that is
really the bottom line issue: our American companies selling world oil
outside of the United States.  Think about that.
Now I want to say a couple of other things about reserves which are a
function of place and time. Nobody looks for more oil than they
reasonably expect to use in the next fifteen years. Period.  Because once
you’ve got fifteen years of reasonable supply, if you’re a corporation, why
the hell do you spend more money looking for more oil to use thirty years
from now?
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The second point is about price. At a certain price there is enough oil to
take care of the world, even with wildly escalating demand for hundreds of
years into the future. The question is, at what price? There are such things
as tar sands and artificial ways of producing oil. We’ve got the stuff, the
problem is price.  It gets too high. The real constraints are environmental.
And finally I have a story that came from my investigation in the seven-
ties, when I was able to look at any document I wanted to see inside the
Chevron Corporation.  For reasons that I can’t go into, we (the Foreign
Relations Committee) issued a subpoena and as a result were invited to, as
the Chevron Corporation said, “Come search. Look for what you are
looking for. You can see anything in the place.”
I found in that place the corporation’s forward planning documents. All
their economists were doing exactly what economists always do:  take a
point here and project it to infinity. It’s a very simple kind of proposition.
We expect annual growth at blah, blah, blah, and here is the curve. And
they had different cases, high growth, medium growth, low growth. They
had all the usual projections. And then there was one future planning
document that showed no growth. What was this?  What was this document
about? And I met with the Chairman of Chevron and said, “What happened
here?  Why did you propose this?” And he responded, “Well, you know,
there was a story of the grain of gold and the emperor. When asked what he
wanted he said, ‘All I want you to do is take this chessboard and put one
grain on the first square and then for the next year put two grains and then
keep multiplying, geometrically each year until we get to the last square at
which point it would be clear that all the gold in the world was on the
chess board.’”
What he was saying was this: “We cannot keep infinitely expanding the
growth of the use of petroleum.” It just is not possible. There is not enough
capital unless we want all the capital in the world to be used to produce
energy. And that is the core problem.
I have listened to many somewhat glib statements about converting other
energy sources.  And it sounds wonderful. But the turnover for the U.S.
vehicle fleet is a minimum of ten years. If we started tomorrow, with hydro-
gen or something else, figure minimum ten years. Assuming everybody went
out in their usual time to buy a new car, we’d get there in ten years, maybe.
Then there is a problem of supply. Think about the universality of the
availability of gasoline.
And then ask yourself, what kind of infrastructure would it take to
provide similar universal availability for an alternative fuel. Then think
about the dumb way we have constructed our suburbs, which require the
use of fuel, and ask yourself what the cost of correcting that stupid
mistake will be.
And the dumbest of these easy solutions is, “By the way, we will use
corn.”  I would say that we are committed as far as continuing to use
petroleum.  And it is important to acknowledge that a major use of petro-
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leum for which there is no substitute is aircraft fuel. You can’t go to coal or
natural gas. Over 20 percent of the current use of petroleum is to fly air-
planes, and there’s no good alternative fuel for that.
In the long term the things we have to worry about are continuity of
supply, protection through the strategic reserve, and then finally, how to
break this terrible cycle of going to bed with the devil. And that’s our deal
with Saudi Arabia. It’s our deal with Equatorial Guinea.  It’s our deal with
one little dictatorship after another.
The crooks who run these countries take the money, put it in our banks,
use it for their own personal purposes, and as long as it is invested here,
we’re happy and they’re happy. We get that oil.
But it all has to stop, because it’s not sustainable.
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Many have lamented the lack of a coherent, strategic energy policy in the United States. The good news is that someone does have a
coherent, relatively integrated approach to energy as a strategically signifi-
cant commodity. Perhaps you will consider it bad news that the nation with
such a strategy is Russia. In oil, gas, and even electricity, Russia is giving
clear signals that it intends to become and remain a player in world energy
politics. Nor is this the first era in which Russia has been an important
player of “power politics.” Shortly before its collapse, the Soviet Union was
the largest oil producer in the world, extracting 11 million barrels of oil a
day in Russia alone, and 12 million overall.1 In that era, the USSR played
power politics in two ways. Moscow strove to be a reliable, nonpoliticized
supplier to non-allies at world prices, while using heavily subsidized prices
to discipline and reward allies. Hence, as a supplier to Europe, the Soviet
Union earned a reputation for being a reliable, commercial supplier, follow-
ing economic rather than political objectives when the two conflicted.2 At
the same time, however, the Soviet Union used variable quantities of subsi-
dized energy exports to discipline its Eastern European allies.3 The strategic
question for the future is; which pattern from its Soviet experience will
Moscow follow?
The answer matters because, although Russia today is extracting less oil
than it was in 1989, since its economy is less energy-intensive, it is export-
ing more — making Russia the second largest oil exporter after Saudi
Arabia. Russia has been in the top two producers since shortly after Sep-
tember 11, 2001. At that time, Russia flooded world markets with cheap oil,
for two main reasons. The first was to prove they could. Nearly a decade
had been invested in revitalizing the infrastructure that Russia inherited in
the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, and they were ready to compete for
Fueling the
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a larger share of the world market. The second reason they hit the world
market hard after 9/11 was to demonstrate solidarity with the United
States. They were signaling that, regardless of what response the United
States crafted to 9/11, the Middle East didn’t have the power to use the oil
weapon with devastating effect at that moment. Russia was also hoping
that this display of solidarity would win support from the United States for
their taking a new role in world oil markets: before 9/11, U.S. foreign policy
had focused more on shoring up the sovereignty of the non-Russian succes-
sor states with oil, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, than it had on encouraging
Russia to arise again as a world oil power.
Russia has maintained the market share it captured in the post-9/11
world, producing 9.0 million bbl/day to Saudi Arabia’s 9.5 million in Sep-
tember 2004.4 Currently, Russia is more limited by its ability to export —
that is, by its lack of pipelines — than by any other factor, and Russia is
negotiating to build a wide array of new pipelines. There are many prob-
lems with pipeline construction, including a persistent tension between
market forces and state intervention, but in the current era of high prices
and growing demand, Moscow is free to use the politics of scarcity in
allocating room in its limited pipelines: oil companies in favor with Moscow
have more access to pipelines. Oil companies out of favor are compelled to
use rail transit, a much more expensive way to bring oil to market.
There has been much discussion about pipeline construction, but there is a
question more fundamental than which lines to construct in which direc-
tions: Is Russian oil extraction really sustainable? Russian oil costs approxi-
mately $15/bbl to get to market (for those with access to a pipeline), while
Saudi oil costs a mere $3/bbl. If Russia is not careful with its federal budget-
ing, it will also share Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability to price swings — debt.
Saudi Arabia currently counts on at least $15 per barrel in debt service to
remain solvent. When you factor this in, the breakeven price for Saudi
Arabia ($3 extraction plus $15 debt service) was actually higher than it was
for Russia back in fall 2001, since the Russian budget at that time did not
assume high oil revenues. That is how Russia managed to force Saudi
Arabia to the negotiating table, and how it won its place as the second
largest exporter in the world. I concur with those analysts who doubt that
oil prices will return to price bands below $30, but Russia certainly remains
vulnerable to drops in oil prices because its cost of extraction will remain
high, and its budgetary reliance on oil has grown dramatically since 2001.
The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that a $1 change in oil prices
causes a $1.4 billion change (in the same direction) in Russian revenues at
this time.5
However, what will limit Russia regardless of its fiscal behavior is its
reserves. While the Middle East enjoys some 56.5 percent of proven world
reserves in oil, the entire former Soviet space has but 6.4 percent, a signifi-
cant portion of which is located in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. So if Russia
has such limited reserves, why is it playing such a tough game in oil? The
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answer may well lie in the gas sector. Although Russia’s proven oil reserves
are meager compared to the Middle East, its gas reserves are quite competi-
tive. In fact, 35.5 percent of proven gas reserves in the world are in the
former USSR, much of it in Russia. The Middle East has only 35.9 percent.
Russia has approached Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan in an
effort to engage them in a gas suppliers’ cartel. Although this cartel is
currently very poorly defined (and all three post-Soviet states may opt out
of such a cartel), Russia is clearly learning how cartels work through its
negotiations with OPEC. Russia need not establish a global cartel in order
to have some success. Unlike oil, which is a global commodity, natural gas is
a regional commodity. Oil is supply driven — meaning that, wherever it is
found, it will be extracted and sent to a waiting market. Gas, by contrast, is
demand driven. Reserves are not exploited until an end-user is found, and
long-term agreements are established, because gas is more difficult to store
and transport than oil. This may change in the longer-term future, if LNG is
developed on a larger scale, but for now exploitation of gas depends on a
proven market. So who is the buyer for Russia’s gas? Europe. Demand for
gas, as Europe retires nuclear power plants and also pursues lower green-
house gas emissions, is growing dramatically. Russia is well aware that
Europe needs Russian gas to make its transition to lower emissions without
damaging productivity, and so far European states have been willing to sign
long-term contracts with the Russian state gas company, Gazprom, in spite
of the fact that it has a reputation for being very nontransparent and closely
linked to Kremlin politics. Europe has no reason to believe that Gazprom’s
style of business is changing any time soon. Putin told Schroeder directly in
2003, “We are not going to break up Gazprom. The European Commission
should have no illusion: they are going to be dealing with the state in the
natural gas industry.”6
The Khodorkovsky trial suggests that oil in Russia will, over time, be-
come more like gas, rather than the reverse. Russia is increasingly taking a
heavy state hand in the energy sector. The government’s stabilization fund,
established in January 2004 for windfall oil profits, now holds an estimated
$16.7 billion,7 and is likely to be spent at least in part on buying up addi-
tional energy infrastructure.
Putin has long held reconsolidation of the state’s power in Russia as a key
goal of his administration. From a Western perspective, this reconsolidation
is cause for concern, but consider for a moment Putin’s position. By 2000,
according to a well-known Russia analyst, “Collectively, the economic
power of Russia’s twenty-five richest men far outstripped that of the Rus-
sian state.”8 The majority of these so-called oligarchs have their fortunes in
the energy sector. Putin’s goal has been to return the state to a position of
primacy, and energy is a key component in his strategy.
Perhaps the most significant outlier in energy is electricity — a sector in
which the Russian state also has strong interest, but which is managed
somewhat differently. Russian electricity, specifically the Russian Joint-
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Stock Company — Unified Energy Systems of Russia (RAO-UES), is a
corporation in which the government has a majority share. But it has a
reputation for being the most transparent of the energy sectors, and the
energy sector in which Russian state interests are not always closely re-
flected in the parastatal’s business behavior. Anatoly Chubais, an architect
of the privatization program in the early 1990s and one of the energy
oligarchs, is CEO of RAO-UES. He is openly proud of the fact that, under
his leadership, all of the former Soviet republics began operating on a
parallel grid in fall 2003. Parallel grid operation for the entire former Soviet
space is particularly notable because it was never achieved during the
Soviet era.9 RAO-UES completed significant purchases in the Caucasus in
2003 and in Central Asia in 2004, largely through debt-for-equity swaps.
Although nations like Georgia had reservations about portions of their
systems being bought up by a Russian parastatal, there are some clear
advantages. An integrated grid increases the quality and reliability of
electricity, by ensuring that shortfall in one area can be supplied by another
area, and that surplus electricity in one area can be exported rather than
wasted.
RAO-UES made the purchases, hoping to export power through the
former Soviet space into desirable markets including Turkey, Iran, and
Afghanistan. It has already begun such exports. It has also reduced disputes
over debt and theft of power. Most importantly, however, RAO-UES has,
through these purchases in the CIS, positioned itself better for links to a
larger European grid by way of Turkey, and to markets in Pakistan and
China.
Electricity is more value-added than export of raw materials such as oil
or gas and may prove to be an increasingly attractive energy export for
Russia. Interestingly, if Russia seeks to play a larger role in electricity
markets, the energy security of the southern tier near abroad may be en-
hanced, since these states are rapidly being transformed from end-of-the-
grid consumers to strategically important transit states.This enhanced
security of former Soviet states may come at the expense of Europe’s energy
security. The key question in electricity is whether Putin will continue to
tolerate Chubais’s relative independence in such a strategic sector.10 If he
moves against RAO-UES, he risks losing access to European electricity
markets, as electricity in Europe is more transparent than the oil or gas
sectors.
In short, Russia has oil, gas, and electricity, and is using oil windfalls to
increase the state’s holdings in all three sectors. The sectors are not being
developed along Western lines, but rather in a manner that enhances Rus-
sian state political power, and potentially increases Russia’s strategic signifi-
cance to Europe, and its leverage with Europe. Russia has a vision of
providing power in various forms to Europe, and thereby remaining a
power in Europe. It remains to be seen if economic rationality will dominate
or be subordinate to political logic in Russia’s energy export strategy.
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Fueling the
Superpowers
In February 2005 crude oil futures prices jumped to exceed $51 a barrel. In conjunction with terrorist risk premiums, China’s surging demand for
oil is a major driver behind the soaring prices. In fact, since the beginning of
2000, China has accounted for 40 percent of the growth in world oil de-
mand.
Oil is an essential ingredient in China’s successful formula for economic
growth, especially owing to the fact that China is at an oil-intensive stage of
development. It is critical for driving industrial activity, generating power,
constructing infrastructure projects, and fueling the rapidly growing number
of automobiles on Chinese roads. Today there are 25 million vehicles on the
road and that number is projected to double by 2010 and reach 150 million
by 2020. China’s domestic oil production is flat, and therefore, in order to
meet its growing appetite, China has been a net oil importer since 1993.
Today, imports comprise 35 to 40 percent of China’s total oil consumption,
growing 31 percent in 2003, and by 2020 some estimates put China’s depen-
dency on foreign oil as high as 70 percent. As the rapidly growing economy
further expands and the populace becomes wealthier, demand for oil will
continue to swell.
Oil consumption in the United States, the world’s largest consumer of
petroleum, is expected to grow nearly 50 percent over the coming twenty
years. Beijing, also on the fast-track to oil dependency, is currently on a
search to secure energy sources across the globe. This quest, in addition to
China’s heavy reliance on Middle Eastern oil (roughly one-half of its im-
ports come from there), suggests a potential rivalry between the United
States and China over access to oil-rich regions. Many analysts argue that
the trajectories of the world’s two most voracious oil consumers will inevita-
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Will the United States and China actually square off in a war for re-
sources sometime during the first half of the century? The potential for a
coming collision over the world’s limited oil reserves does, in fact, exist. But
several essential considerations must be examined before drawing such a
conclusion.
First, until recently, China’s energy strategy has appeared disjointed,
often fixed on multiple mutually exclusive objectives and quite often de-
signed to meet political ends at the expense of economic considerations. As
a result of instability in the Middle East and the need to maintain economic
growth as a means to achieve social stability, however, Chinese authorities
have recently approached the nation’s energy policy in a fundamentally new
way. Foremost, in contrast to the long-standing strategy of advocating self-
reliance supplemented by oil imports from the Middle East, Beijing has
embarked on a diversification strategy both in terms of the development of
alternative fuels and the establishment of new oil-import markets. In the
PRC’s State Council November 2003 report, it was officially declared that
China plans to pursue an energy development strategy focused on securing
“a diverse energy mix.”
Examples of Beijing’s desire to reduce its dependence on foreign oil and to
expand its energy mix include the following: the recent move to solicit bids
on four newly proposed nuclear power reactors, increased oil imports from
its current importers, such as, South Africa, Iran, Oman, Sudan, Angola,
Vietnam, Yemen, Indonesia, Russia, Kuwait, with special focus on boosting
imports from Central Asia, Russia, and Africa. Additional examples include:
the ongoing construction of three large liquid natural gas projects along the
Chinese coast, plans to establish a strategic petroleum reserve, plans to
increase offshore exploration, and continued interest in the construction of a
number of pipelines (Kazak; Russia; Turkmenistan).  CNPC has acquired oil
concessions from Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, Peru, and
Azerbaijan.
One example that clearly illustrates Beijing’s relatively recent shift to-
ward and focus on energy security policy is the recent decision to move
forward on construction of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline. In 1997,  at
the time the original agreement was made, the 3,000-kilometer pipeline
from Kazakhstan to China made little commercial sense when compared to
the alternative of having oil imported from international markets and
delivered to China’s eastern coast via tanker. The deal instead was part of
Beijing’s strategic efforts to partner with Central Asian nations to protect
against potential proindependent uprisings along the Xinjiang border as
well as to counter growing U.S. presence in the region. In fact, after seven
years, only the first 400 kilometers of the pipeline had been completed. The
recent push to finish up the second, much larger, section of the project
demonstrates Beijing’s latest yearning to lock in new energy supplies and
diversify away from Middle Eastern oil.
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Second, technological advances in the oil industry and the development of
alternative energy sources will allow, over time, energy users to become
more efficient and decrease their overall reliance on oil. As China’s
economy expands further, competitive enterprises will develop and adopt
new technology, which will result in more efficient energy use. Presently,
China is well behind the United States in energy efficiency. In 2001 China’s
energy users spent $151 billion, approximately 13 percent of GDP as com-
pared to the United States where energy use comprised only 7 percent of
GDP.
No one knows when Earth’s remaining oil deposits will dry up, but almost
all experts agree that before mid-century the world’s oil supply will “peak”
— marking a change from an increasing supply of cheap oil to a dwindling
supply of expensive oil. Therefore, the technological advances required
shifting away from oil reliance toward substitutes such as natural gas,
hydropower, biomass, and other renewables are not only welcome but
necessary. In the future, when the cost of developing and utilizing alterna-
tive energy sources equalizes with the cost of oil use, simple economics will
drive rapid progress in these areas. Oil dependency will decline as it be-
comes more economical to take advantage of alternative energy sources. In
fact, the United States Department of Energy forecasts a decline in oil prices
from current prices well over $40 a barrel today to $27 in 2025 as a result
of new exploration and production technologies as well as alternative
sources of energy.
The third factor to be contemplated when analyzing the likelihood of a
future U.S.-Sino oil clash is the dynamic bilateral relationship these two
powers share. Since dialogue began in the early 1970s, progress on strate-
gic, political, cultural, and commercial levels has flourished and resulted in
a very strong, mutually beneficial relationship. As a sidebar, it is interesting
to note that Colin Powell remarked on several occasions that U.S.-China
relations are the best they’ve been in thirty years; while in China recently, I
had several officials and scholars comment that the current state of U.S.-
China relations has reached a level of maturity not previously obtained.
During the Bush administration, two strategic points of convergence have
arisen: North Korea and terrorism. For example, in the realm of commercial
ties, the United States has become China’s second largest trading partner
while China has become the United States’ third largest trading partner.
The large number of shared interests not only provides incentives for avoid-
ing a showdown over a single limited resource, but also provides multiple
spheres in which cooperation and diplomatic arrangements can be worked
out. In fact, last summer the two nations agreed to launch the U.S.-China
Energy Policy Dialogue, which will expand energy related interactions and
cooperation between the world’s two largest energy consumers.
So the question remains: Will growing demand for oil sour the U.S.-China
relationship to such a degree that a collision is inevitable? I contend that
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China’s newly evolving energy strategy, technological progress in the oil
industry and the increasingly robust bilateral relationship make this claim
unlikely.
I do believe the potential for this rivalry certainly exists and that energy
concerns could prove to have a significant negative impact on the relation-
ship. I’d like to enumerate a couple of points that illustrate this:
1) In its current pursuit to secure energy resources, China has adopted a
mercantilist or almost zero-sum approach. Beijing perceives the United
States as encircling and pursing a containment strategy against it. It is
worried about sea lane security — for example, were a crisis to break out in
the Taiwan Strait, it fears the United States would cut off vital sea lanes —
such as the Straits of Malacca — which would cause major oil supply
disruptions. Furthermore, China is concerned by the large and likely long-
term United States presence in the Middle East — to a degree, it buys into
the argument that the United States was driven by oil concerns to invade
Iraq; China sees itself operating outside the large multinational oil corpora-
tions based in the United States and is afraid of the implications of this.
Moreover, Beijing views the relatively new and robust American military
bases in Central Asia and long-standing U.S.-Japan alliance as potential
threats and part of an effort to contain China. There are mixed messages in
the Chinese response to the Angarsk to Nakhodka pipeline on the one hand
and the Kazak-China pipeline on the other. This perception of being threat-
ened and encircled by the United States is aggravated by energy concerns
and has detrimental effects on the state of the bilateral relationship and if
continuously fueled, over a considerable amount of time, could develop into
a serious hazard for bilateral ties.
2) Another geopolitical consideration is China’s increasing involvement with
nations the United States deems unfriendly like Sudan and Iran. The Chinese
signaled strong opposition toward the proposal in the UN Security Council
in 2004 to implement sanctions on Sudan. In light of the fact that China and
Iran recently signed a $75-100 billion oil and gas deal, what would be the
implications for U.S.-Sino relations if the United States were to propose
taking similar actions toward Iran? This is a hot spot that has the potential
to flare up and cause major damage to the relationship.
3) Certain Americans have found China’s recent efforts to secure energy
resources in Canada and Venezuela (the United States depends on both for
one-quarter of its oil imports) as a Chinese attempt to sneak into the United
States by a back door and deemed this behavior as potentially threatening
to U.S. national interests. Additionally, CNOOC has considered purchasing
Unocal — an American oil company — a move that could add fodder to the
“China threat” fire in the United States. The proposition really makes sense
because the company mainly does business in Asia but this could stir up a
backlash on Capitol Hill.
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What Can the U.S. Do?
1) First and foremost, it’s not in the United States’ interest to have an
energy- starved China.
2) The United States can help China slow down its demand growth —
should cooperate on new technology and promote efficiency. U.S.-China
Energy Policy Dialogue is a step in the right direction. The forum’s aim will
be to increase collaboration in high energy and nuclear physics, fossil
energy, energy efficiency and renewable energy, and energy information
exchanges (pollution-free hydrogen; nuclear fusion; natural gas; oil recovery
technology).
3) Move forward and encourage regional cooperation in Asia to reduce
angst over supply disruption. The United States should promote the forma-
tion of an entity like an Asian IEA.
4) The United States should also take steps to further strengthen the existing
bilateral relationship across the board including the realms of economics/
commercial; diplomacy; cultural; security. Should take whatever additional
measures needed to dispel the notion that the U.S. is encircling China.
What Can China Do?
1) Tax fuel consumption more effectively.
2) Leapfrog to cleaner cars.
3) Tighten up restrictions on vehicle efficiency.
4) Migrate to gas as soon as possible.
Maintaining a robust economic growth is seen as a top priority by the
leadership in Beijing. Economic growth is key to job creation, job creation is
key to maintaining social stability, and, of course, social stability is key to
ensuring the CCP’s authority and legitimacy.
This presentation material is based on an article written by Travis Tanner entitled, “The Oil
that Troubles U.S.- China Waters,” Asian Times Online (www.atimes.com), June 18, 2004.
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Let me begin by stating some myths about Muslims and Iranians, taking a brief look at the history of U.S. relations with Iran and then giving
you five building blocks for moving forward.
Some of you here have said that the Middle East is unstable. A majority
of people in the United States think it is something about Muslims. We are
unstable folks, as Bernard Lewis has led you all to believe. And we are
deviants. There is something wrong with our religion. We Muslims are,
somehow, not to be trusted. These are all myths. Myths that are propagated
by people who don’t know Muslims, have amnesia when it comes to history,
and, in the case of Iran, people who do not go regularly to Iran and interact
with all segments of society. Hopefully you will agree with me when I am
done.
Now let me tell you a little bit about this unstable part of the world and in
particular about Iran. After the Second World War, Northern Iran was
occupied by the Soviet Union. America was wonderful and got the Russians
out. Iranians were very, very grateful. But then something happened —
 now you must understand that people in the Middle East are not fools, we
get degrees, we understand what goes on in this world — but America
conspired with Great Britain to oust the democratically elected prime
minister of Iran, Mohammed Mossadegh, to obstruct Iran’s nationalization
of its oil, something it had the right to do under international law. America
did this and yet America preached and continues to preach the benefits of
democracy.
We Iranians went our way for the next few years and the United States
brought the Shah back in 1953. (Norman Schwarzkopf, by the way, spent
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his youth in Iran where his father came to train the Iranian police. He has
spoken of his very fond memories of growing up there.) And then for quite a
long time the Shah was America’s greatest ally in that part of the world. Of
course, there were people who grumbled about some of the things that the
Shah did. People used to go to jail, but nobody cared about that. That was
all democratic! Interestingly, the United States and the Europeans at that
time blessed Iran’s acquisition of nuclear power with the German company
Siemens taking the lead. Why was nuclear power okay then? Iran was in
the U.S. camp and it did America’s bidding. The answer is that simple.
Then, if you recall, a revolution occurred, and in that revolution Iran did
a horrible thing — Iran took hostages. This was a terrible mistake on Iran’s
part. But, you know, I don’t believe one American died in Iran. Perhaps
there was one who died in an oil field, but that death was unrelated to
politics.
Again, let me emphasize that it was a horrible thing what this little,
insignificant country did to the United States by taking hostages. But then
Iraq invaded Iran, if you recall. Now, you have something called the United
Nations and we mustn’t undermine that. Absolutely. But if we want to also
stand for the rule of law, we should say that what Iraq did was not right.
But we didn’t. The United States wanted Iran threatened, humbled, and
punished and so it was okay to undermine the UN. Any thinking person
should have said that this would have ominous implications for the UN and
for Iran’s relations with its neighbors and with the U.S. The results were
predictable. The UN lost its credibility in Iran. Now the UN Security Coun-
cil has no moral sway in Iran. It is an instrument of U.S. policy. That’s it.
You cannot turn the credibility tap on and off.
But, no, the government did not exactly care about the rule of law and
the UN because there were those fifty-two hostages. And so the United
States allowed Iraq to invade Iran, and over 500 thousand Iranians died. I’m
not going to go through what happened to the Iraqis and all the others. I
will just speak about one little country, Iran. Over 500 thousand Iranians
died.
Then, if you recall, the Iraqis got pushed back and Iran was very close to
taking over Basra in 1982–83. When the United States saw that this was
happening, the United States looked the other way and encouraged Saddam
Hussein to use outlawed biological and chemical weapons to push back the
Iranians; all other sorts of U.S. support, including battlefield intelligence,
was given to the Iraqis. And the United States looked the other way when
chemical weapons were sold by Germany to Iraq, then by France and Great
Britain; yes, the U.S. even has the receipts! Chemical and biological weap-
ons hurt more Iranians than any other group since the Second World War.
Today there are many, many Iranians breathing from oxygen tanks (over
four thousand in Tehran alone according to the New York Times) and
seated in wheelchairs. You see the misery of war in the streets of all major
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Iranian cities. Do you see why and how the United States has lost the moral
high ground?
A wonderful thing about the Iranian people is they don’t hold it against
the Iraqis at all. They blame it all on Saddam Hussein. I am proud that
Iranians reacted to the war in that fashion. They don’t blame it on the Iraqi
people, but on Saddam Hussein. And, of course, as you will see in my
conclusion, they blame some of it on the United States. The United States
sold and allowed the Germans and others to sell Iraq chemical and biologi-
cal weapons. The U.S. could have even stopped the war from getting
started, but it did not. Is it realistic for Iranians over thirty years of age to
trust U.S. intentions and believe in U.S. propaganda for the rule of law and
its drive for democracy?
Iran could not acquire any weapons. And what Iranians had to do — I
know that first hand. The people who were involved told me about it —
they had to engage third parties to buy conventional weapons. And 80
percent of the time they got cheated because you can’t go to somebody and
say the equivalent of, “I wanted to buy cocaine from this guy,” and then
complain “but he didn’t deliver.”
Iranians fought. And they lost all these people. It was U.S. national policy
to do that. Iran complained about the use of outlawed weapons to the UN.
But again the United States did not stand up for the rule of law. The U.S.
argued that there was insufficient evidence when it had the receipts of
biological and chemical weapons sales to Iraq!
The Iran-Iraq War is etched into the psyche of Iranians over thirty years
of age who lived in Iran during those eight terrifying years. Iran was bullied
and massacred because they had taken fifty-two hostages and because U.S.
interests appeared to be threatened in the Persian Gulf. Do you see why
Iranians feel insecure?
Then Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Iran opened its borders to Ku-
waitis to flee Saddam’s wrath, Kuwait the country that along with Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had bankrolled Saddam’s invasion of
Iran. Iranians were magnanimous in Kuwait’s hour of need. Iran was also
generally cooperative with the coalition forces because admittedly it was
also in Iran’s interest.
Then after the war, the United States said, “Let’s have national security
for the Gulf Region, but we’ll bring in Egypt and leave Iran out.” The
Iranians said, “Egypt? What has Egypt got to do with this? Has the world
map changed?” But the United States said, “Look, these are evil people,
these Iranians. There are 70 million of these guys. We’ve got to do some-
thing about it. We must keep the Iranians out and bring in Egyptians to
neutralize them.” And you will see what the future implication of this is for
the United States in a moment.
Then came 9/11. Iranians held spontaneous demonstrations in sympathy
for the U.S. Then the U.S. went into Afghanistan. And that was a wonder-
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ful, interesting example of another U.S. policy. Who created Osama bin
Laden? But you all know that, so I’m not going to go over it again. And, of
course, the Saudis helped.
And here were these Iranians, these terrible folks who helped the North-
ern Alliance. Now everybody has conveniently forgotten about that. But
when the United States went in there, who helped? The Northern Alliance
did most of the on-ground fighting. The U.S. relied on them, these allies of
Iran. Instead of reaching out to Iranians, Mr. Bush labeled them as a found-
ing member of the “Axis of Evil.” That was Iran’s reward! The United
States seems to have a convenient memory loss at critical times. Zalmay
Khalilzad wrote an article in the Wall Street Journal, I think that is where it
was, praising the Taliban, the good guys. Then he became the U.S. ambas-
sador to Afghanistan (and later to Iraq)!
Then we have the invasion of Iraq. Now add this up in the mind of an
Iranian and other Middle Easterners. When somebody comes to you before
the invasion of Iraq and says, “We’re for democracy. We’re against this man
Saddam, the mad man, having chemical weapons.” Are they credible?
There is something that doesn’t quite ring true. Now that things have gone
wrong in Iraq, who is to blame? Call out the usual suspect. Put the blame on
Iran’s doorstep!
Now we are saying that these Iranians are acquiring nuclear weapons.
For a nation that has got the United States on its left, on its right, to its
south, to its north . . . just put yourself in their position. A nation that is
threatened every which way by the United States on a constant basis. The
long and the short of it is this: Iranians feel insecure. The underlying reason
for their insecurity is the history of U.S. aggression, the fact that the U.S.
and the UN do not uphold the rule of law, the U.S. has surrounded Iran on
every side and the U.S. threatens Iran with regime change, invasion, and
more. What would you do?
     But let’s first face the nuclear issue head on. The Non-Proliferation
Treaty is clear about the rights and obligations of its signatories.
Signatories that were not nuclear powers when the treaty was adopted
have the right to peaceful nuclear power development, including: enrich-
ment, research, and light- and heavy-water reactors. Moreover, signatories
would receive technological and safety-related support in their quest to
develop peaceful nuclear power. In return, the signatories agreed to forego
nuclear weapons and to open up their facilities to IAEA inspection and
safeguards. In turn, the nuclear powers agreed to reduce their nuclear
arsenal and in time to eliminate all such weapons. In the case of Iran, the
United States has argued that Iran has lost its rights and privileges under
the NPT for the following reasons: in the past it did not fully disclose its
nuclear program, it is pursuing nuclear weapons, it has so much oil and gas
that it does not need nuclear power, and the regime in Tehran cannot be
trusted and is dangerous.
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      It is true that in the past Iran did not disclose all of its nuclear facilities,
but Iran gives a credible reason for its nondisclosure: its facilities would
have been attacked before they were constructed — a justification sup-
ported by Iran’s experience with international duplicity (as briefly outlined
above). Still Iran has not technically violated the terms of the NPT. More-
over, there is not a shred of hard evidence to support the assertion that Iran
is developing nuclear weapons. Further, Iran has now opened up its facilities
to IAEA inspection that goes beyond legal IAEA requirements and IAEA
inspectors have found traces of highly enriched uranium, which seem to
have come from secondhand equipment bought by Iran.
     In wake of the Iraq War, the world can hardly believe U.S. assertions on
the basis of hard evidence “that cannot be disclosed for fear of harming
confidential sources.” Iran’s reserves of oil and gas are indeed expansive but
this is totally irrelevant to the legal interpretation of the NPT. Interestingly,
the United States did not criticize and threaten the Cooperation Council for
the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) — consisting of six countries with one-
third of Iran’s population and about three times Iran’s oil and gas — for its
announcement earlier in December to develop peaceful nuclear power.
     This naturally leads to the fourth U.S. justification for taking away Iran’s
right to peaceful nuclear power: that the regime in Tehran is dangerous. But
that rationale would, again, contravene the treaty, which does not dis-
qualify certain regimes from its provisions.
Why was Iran’s nuclear program under the Shah acceptable, but not
under the current regime? Doesn’t the right of peaceful nuclear power
belong to a people, Iran, as opposed to a particular regime, a shah or a
mullah? Moreover, do not regimes change over time, for good or for bad?
Would the United Nations allow peaceful development with a regime
subjectively considered “good” and then approve of the destruction of
facilities when a “bad” regime comes to power? Is Saudi Arabia’s regime a
“bad” regime? If so, on what grounds? What should the world community
do about a country (say, Pakistan) that has nuclear weapons and some
consider to be ruled by a “bad” regime? Does a so-called bad regime be-
come, by virtue of some policy alchemy, an accepted nuclear power once it
has acquired the weapons and a delivery system?
      For the United States and the other nuclear powers that blame Iran for
alleged transgressions, we have to ask a simple question: have the nuclear
powers kept up their end of the bargain to reduce and eventually eliminate
their nuclear weapons as called for in the NPT? The simple answer is no.
While that standard was upheld during the Reagan era — as both the
United States and the Soviets reduced their nuclear arsenals — under the
Bush Administration the United States is building new classes of nuclear
warheads; China is still increasing the number of its nuclear weapons;
Britain recently announced a new nuclear weapon program; and France has
been building new weapons. The United States is affording India, a non-
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signatory to the NPT, all the privileges of signatories, although India has
developed nuclear warheads outside the NPT and will not have to open all
of its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. In short, the nuclear powers
clearly have not adhered to the NPT and the treaty did not grant the Secu-
rity Council, or any of its members, the right to deny nonnuclear signatories
their rights and privileges on the basis of their oil, gas, or coal reserves —
or on the acceptability of their regimes.
      If the Bush Administration is sincere in its quest for global nonprolifera-
tion, and is not simply trying to leverage legitimate concerns on prolifera-
tion to single out a regime it dislikes, then why did it vote against two
resolutions, introduced by Arab countries, at the IAEA annual meeting on
September 21. The resolutions, both of which were supported by Iran, called
for converting the Middle East into a nuclear-free zone, and for all Middle
East countries to accept IAEA safeguards. The United States and its allies
defeated the first resolution by a vote of 45 to 29, in favor of taking no
action. The second resolution passed by a vote of 89 to 2, with the United
States and Israel being the odd couple.
Now, if I, this good little boy who left Iran at the age of nine, were
running Iran, I would have done things differently. I would have a strong
Iranian economy, which the mullahs don’t have, and I would already have
peaceful nuclear power in place; and with that in place, the outside world
would be less likely to resort to Iran-bullying because they might feel that
Iran could acquire nuclear weapons if threatened again. It is in Iran’s
interest to acquire nuclear technology and nuclear power. It is a popular
policy in Iran. And if the mullahs had sense, they would acquire nuclear
power because the Iranian people want it, and that is a fact. Iranians feel
insecure. So if you want to understand Iran, don’t get up every morning and
bash it, try instead to understand why they feel insecure and deal with
that.
One final point before my conclusion: the mullahs are very much like the
Republicans. I’m serious. Think about it. You could do business with these
guys. You sit around here in the United States and say, “These guys are
fanatics.” But the fanatics are in Saudi Arabia in Najd, not in Iran. You’ve
got it all wrong. Iranians are not fanatics. The mullahs understand moolah!
The United States has got to appreciate that they understand money. They
understand business. And I’m not saying that is wonderful for Iran, by no
means.
Now in this very brief history of Iran-U.S. relations, I will come to my
five, very simple conclusions that might help to understand Iran and to
move forward and one prediction.
The first conclusion: you can’t have it both ways. There is something
called guilt by association: as my grandmamma used to say, “If you sleep
with people who have fleas, you will catch fleas.” The United States has
supported all of these dictators and undermined the rule of law all these
years and now says, “We’re for democracy and for the rule of law!”
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Lesson two: democracy is not a tap that you can turn on. The United
States has brought democracy to Iraq, yet supports Musharraf, Mubarak,
the Al-Sauds, and many of these guys! And then the U.S. says, “Iran is
tyrannical.” I’m sorry, by anyone’s reasonable conclusion, Iranian elections
are flawed. I absolutely agree and I’m willing to admit that. But Iran is more
democratic than any other Middle Eastern country (let’s leave Israel out as I
don’t want to have that discussion). It is a duplicitous thing to bash Iran and
call these other guys democratic. Iran has a vice president who is a woman.
Women vote. I hate that they force anyone to wear any kind of veil. And
yes, I agree with you, in Iran, they do many very restrictive things. In the
Arab countries they are way behind on that. So don’t bash Iran and say,
“These guys are fanatical.”
The third conclusion: the United States has lost the moral high ground in
the Middle East. There is no doubt. It is gone. It is bye, bye. Adios. That’s
why the United States is not popular in the Middle East; in this region the
United States is most popular in Israel, followed by Iran. Yes, Iran! And
when people ask me why this is so I say, “Because the U.S. hasn’t had
anything to do with Iran. That’s why.” If the U.S. had anything to do with
these guys it would have been the kiss of death. The U.S. hasn’t touched
them, hasn’t supported the mullahs, and that is why Iranians like the United
States (not the U.S. government).
The fourth conclusion: I firmly believe that economic progress requires
stability. And stability requires economic progress. Oil has been a curse. The
conflicts in the Middle East over the last twenty-five years have cost that
region more than all their oil revenues.
Let that sink in. So we say that the Persian Gulf has had over $3 trillion
dollars worth of oil revenues from 1975 to 2004, yes, but the damage from
wars and instability — infrastructure, lost economic output, GDP — has
been more than that. And that is why, if you look over the last thirty years,
the Middle East has been the worst performing region of the world. This is
not my data, but World Bank and World Development Indicators. In terms
of real growth, on per capita real terms, the only part of the world that is
worse off since 1975 than the Middle East is sub-Saharan Africa.
And conclusion five: Islam-bashing is stupid. The Islam that you get
exposed to is not Islam. The two main tenets of Islam are spread the faith
and economic and social justice. If you read the entirety of the Koran, that
is what it is. I can pick anything from the Bible and make Christianity or
Judaism look bad. And you can pick one phrase out of the Koran out of
context and do likewise. Economic and social justice is the second most
important thing in Islam. Now, tell me which Muslim country has that?
None. So don’t blame Islam. Blame the corrupt governments and dictators in
the Middle East that the United States has supported. It is not Islam. And let
me tell you something, Islam will be there when we are all dead. Islam will
be there when oil has run out. Islam will be there when United States be-
comes a third-world power. So you had better get used to it. Do not try to
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say, “We don’t like Islam and we’ve got to do something about it.” Under-
stand what is true Islam and that some people have perverted it, distorted it,
and used it for their own legitimacy. That is what has happened in that part
of the world.
Now let me give you my prediction. As I’m a betting man, I’m even
willing to give you odds that Iraq will, in fact, become stable — it will take
time — and Iran and Iraq will become allies. They are natural allies. Yes,
they are. They don’t hate each other. This guy from Iraq sitting in the
audience is my friend. I love him. I didn’t like Saddam Hussein; nor did my
friend. But Iran and Iraq are natural allies. It was Saddam who made all this
happen. Iran and Iraq will combine.
And the frightening irony is this, and I’m being serious, that America’s
blood and treasure has been spent to make this happen. That is going to be
a weird situation. Iraq is said by some to have more oil than Saudi Arabia.
And when Iraq and Iran combine, nobody is going to stop them. That was
the nightmare of the United States when it thought that Iran would conquer
Iraq. But Iran and Iraq are going to become allies and U.S. actions will have
joined the two countries! Now that’s a real nightmare for U.S.
policymakers!
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